QuantaDose Press Releases

FDA Quietly Rewrites Its Cell Phone Radiation Pages—Why the “High Exposure” Talking Point Fails, and Why This Shift Matters Now

A familiar dismissal shows up whenever the National Toxicology Program (NTP) results are raised: the exposures were “too high,” so the findings don’t matter.

That line is misleading in two important ways.

First, the NTP did not study one “extreme” dose—it studied multiple whole‑body Specific Absorption Rate (SAR) levels (including a “lower level” group) and still observed tumor signals, with NTP summarizing that heart cancer occurred in ~2% of rats at the lower level and ~5–6% at higher levels. NTP also explicitly notes the higher‑level group was about four times the maximum human exposure limit—meaning critics often cite the “high exposure” fact without acknowledging that the tumor signal is not confined to a single outlier condition.

Second, the “too high” narrative collapses when the NTP findings are evaluated as science is supposed to be evaluated: in the context of replication and convergence. The Ramazzini Institute reported the same tumor types (notably heart schwannomas) under far‑field exposures at much lower whole‑body SAR levels (reported up to 0.1 W/kg). That is not a niche detail—it is the core reason the “it took extreme exposure” talking point does not hold up as a blanket rebuttal.

That context matters—because something significant just happened inside the U.S. regulatory ecosystem.

1) What changed at FDA: from “case closed” language to a “here is what the law requires” posture

For years, FDA webpages conveyed a broad, public‑facing reassurance posture about cellphone RF exposure. For example, archived versions of FDA’s “Do Cell Phones Pose a Health Hazard?” page contained categorical language framed as settled conclusions (including statements that the “weight of scientific evidence has not linked” RF exposure from phones with health problems at or below FCC limits).

As of mid‑January 2026, visitors to that same FDA URL are now routed into FDA’s general “Cell Phones” hub content, which foregrounds FDA’s statutory and interagency role rather than a long narrative of dismissing health concerns. The page emphasizes that FDA shares responsibilities with FCC and lists core duties “under the law,” including:

  • consulting with other federal agencies on testing/evaluation techniques and programs

  • collecting, analyzing, and making available scientific information on hazards and controls of electronic product radiation

Notably, some “weight of evidence” safety phrasing still appears in the hub’s topic blurbs, but the overall presentation is materially different: fewer sweeping assertions and more emphasis on legal responsibility, monitoring, and information stewardship.

2) Why it changed: HHS says it removed “old conclusions” and is launching a new study

According to reporting on January 15, 2026, the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) said FDA removed webpages with “old conclusions” about cellphone radiation while HHS undertakes a new study on electromagnetic radiation and health effects, including identifying knowledge gaps and emerging technologies.

This is not a minor web edit. If HHS is publicly framing prior FDA messaging as “old conclusions” in need of replacement by “fresh research,” it signals an institutional posture shift: less reliance on categorical reassurance language, more emphasis on active review and gap‑finding.

RF Safe has publicly argued that this move is consistent with the government’s long‑standing obligations under Public Law 90‑602 (1968)—the Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act—requiring federal leadership to collect, analyze, and make available information on hazards and controls related to electronic product radiation. (Full statute link is included below.)

RF Safe’s own compliance tracker frames the period from Secretary Robert F. Kennedy Jr.’s swearing‑in through January 15, 2026 as 337 days (inclusive) without what RF Safe considers law‑aligned public positioning and sustained research transparency. That is RF Safe’s interpretation and tracking method, but the broader point is that the organization has treated this as a legal‑duty issue for years, not a marketing dispute.

3) The missing piece readers should not ignore: the 2021 court remand that criticized reliance on FDA’s conclusory posture

This FDA/HHS shift lands on top of a key legal fact that wireless‑safety discussions often omit: in 2021, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held the FCC’s decision to retain its 1996 RF exposure limits was “arbitrary and capricious” for lack of a reasoned explanation, and criticized the FCC’s reliance on conclusory statements from expert agencies without adequately grappling with record evidence.

In other words, the regulatory “safety narrative” didn’t merely face public skepticism—it faced a procedural accountability failure in federal court. That matters because the FCC historically points to FDA and other health agencies for the health rationale behind exposure policy. When FDA messaging shifts away from categorical certainty, the FCC’s “we rely on FDA” posture becomes harder to use as a shield against meaningful review.

4) The research landscape is not one‑note—and that is exactly why the new HHS study must be built correctly

A serious public discussion has to hold two truths at once:

A) Human epidemiology reviews have not uniformly found increased risk

A WHO‑commissioned review reported in 2024 found no link between mobile phone use and increased risk of brain cancer in the analyzed human literature, while noting WHO planned an updated evaluation.

B) Animal and mechanistic evidence has moved in the other direction for specific endpoints

A WHO‑commissioned systematic review published in 2025 (Environment International) concluded high certainty evidence that RF‑EMF exposure increases the incidence of:

  • malignant heart schwannomas, and

  • glial tumors (gliomas)

in experimental animals.

Separately, a WHO‑commissioned systematic review/meta‑analysis on male fertility outcomes concluded, among other findings, moderate certainty evidence of reduced pregnancy rate and low certainty evidence of reduced sperm count, while rating many endpoints as low/very low certainty due to bias and heterogeneity.

This is precisely the point RF Safe has made for decades: when evidence is mixed across endpoints and study types, the right move is not to declare “safe” and stop looking—it is to map boundary conditions (nulls, intensities, modulation patterns, tissues, developmental windows, and combined exposures) and fund the work required to resolve uncertainty.

5) Rebutting the “NTP was too high” line with the actual dose structure and the replication problem

A scientifically responsible framing looks like this:

  • Yes, NTP used whole‑body exposures above typical consumer use patterns to test carcinogenic potential under controlled conditions.

  • But NTP studied multiple exposure levels and still observed tumor signals, including at the “lower level” group, and summarized that tumor incidence increased with power level (roughly ~2% at lower level vs ~5–6% at higher).

  • And the Ramazzini Institute reported the same tumor types under far‑field exposure at lower SAR levels (reported up to 0.1 W/kg).

That trio is why “it was too high” is not a sufficient dismissal. The appropriate scientific question is no longer “were the doses high?” but rather:

What are the boundary conditions under which RF‑EMF exposure produces non‑cancer and cancer‑related biological effects, and how do modulation, tissue susceptibility, timing, and metabolic state shape outcomes?

6) What RF Safe says must happen next: make the HHS study real, transparent, and fit for purpose

HHS has indicated it is undertaking a new study effort to identify gaps. Public details remain limited, and no dedicated HHS project page was readily identifiable at the time this draft was prepared (readers should monitor HHS and FDA releases directly).

However, reporting suggests the initial effort may be relatively modest in scale. One account described a figure of $1.5 million being allocated, as recalled by a professor who said a Kennedy aide told him that amount (this is not the same as an official procurement notice or appropriations line item).

RF Safe’s position is that if federal agencies are serious about fulfilling the 1968 mandate—collecting, analyzing, and making available hazard/control information—then the study design must include, at minimum:

  1. Pre‑2022 and post‑2022 evidence integration
    Not selective citations. Full inclusion of the NTP’s cancer findings, the Ramazzini replication, and the latest WHO‑commissioned systematic reviews (both human epidemiology and animal evidence).

  2. Mechanistic research that does not assume “thermal‑only” as the default gatekeeper
    RF Safe argues that the field needs explicit non‑thermal pathway investigation—oxidative stress, neurobiology, mitochondrial signaling, and bioelectric timing errors—rather than treating “no heating” as synonymous with “no effect.”

  3. Modern exposure realism
    Today’s environment is not just “a phone at the ear.” It is multi‑device, multi‑band, modulated signal conditions, indoor routers, ambient background, and chronic proximity. The study must examine realistic patterns—including vulnerable windows (pregnancy and development), and combined exposures.

  4. Transparent governance
    Pre‑registered protocols, public methods, public conflict‑of‑interest declarations, and public release of results—especially when the study is explicitly framed as identifying knowledge gaps.

7) Solutions RF Safe is advocating now: “safer connectivity” and school protections

RF Safe has consistently argued that the discussion cannot remain trapped in “deny vs panic.” If there is uncertainty and plausible risk, then engineering and infrastructure choices should move toward lower‑exposure architectures—especially around children.

Two policy positions RF Safe has highlighted:

  • Li‑Fi‑first (light‑based connectivity) indoors for schools and child‑dense environments, as a practical substitute for always‑on Wi‑Fi where feasible.

  • Setbacks of at least 1,500 feet between cell towers and schools/homes as a precautionary buffer (RF Safe presents this as a protective policy recommendation, not a universal “magic number,” because real‑world exposure varies with power, tilt, terrain, and network design).

This is also where RF Safe frames its S4 MitoSpin framework: as a working model for why non‑thermal biological effects could show up as non‑linear (i.e., boundary‑condition dependent) rather than cleanly monotonic—making “one‑study dismissal” tactics scientifically inappropriate.

Bottom line

A single deleted webpage does not automatically rewrite federal RF policy. But a coordinated shift—FDA pages changing tone, HHS stating “old conclusions” were removed, and a new study being announced under MAHA—does signal something real:

The era of categorical, confidence‑forward “nothing to see here” messaging is no longer stable.

RF Safe welcomes any move that restores the federal government’s legal and scientific duty to investigate, synthesize, and publish hazard/control information—while urging that the next phase be funded and designed at a level that matches the scale of population exposure and the seriousness of unresolved questions.

Key links and documents (full URLs)